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A Study of the California Penalty Jury
in First-Degree-Murder Cases
Preface

I am grateful to the editors of the Review for their invitation to add a
brief word to their study of the jury and the death penalty under California
law. There is much in their effort that is a source of excitement and encouragement; there are also some tendencies I find disturbing.
The study is another instance of the quite extraordinary assault being
made these days on the problem of the death penalty by the use of empirical
inquiry into its operation. In the last decade the controversy over capital
punishment has taken a new turn. For years debate had been addressed to
the legislature and supplemented by data collected on the issue of whether
capital punishment was in fact a deterrent. While the data fell considerably
short of compelling proof that capital punishment did not deter, it undoubtedly had its impact on public opinion and had its share in developing the
momentum for legislative reform.
The modern attack has been primarily addressed to the courts and to
challenge on constitutional grounds. Its focus has shifted from deterrence
to the administration of the penalty itself and to the strains it has imposed
on legal institutions. Thus there have been studies of whether in operation
the death penalty has been administered with racial bias in the South in
rape cases, studies of patterns of agreement and disagreement in decisions
of jury and judge in death cases, studies of the incidence of executive clemency, studies of death-qualified juries, and the problems for jury selection
created by the exclusion of scrupled jurors. To this cluster the present study
now adds empirical data on the determinants of jury decisions for or
against capital punishment, with special focus on the evenhandedness and
rationality with which the penalty is in reality administered. The strategy
is not simply to argue policy, but to add an empirical underpinning to the
argument; and the objective is not simply to add to our knowledge of the
jury or of the death penalty, but to mount a constitutional challenge. Although I shall voice, in a moment, some misgivings about the editors' desire
to find the "payoff" for their study in direct constitutional attack, I would
here emphasize that the study satisfies two important criteria for significance in the empirical study of legal issues and institutions: continuity and
relevance.
The very existence of the note as a product of law-student work is a fact
of high importance. It, together with the select company of other recent
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student law review notes based on empirical study, marks a development
that may prove as far reaching for legal education and scholarship as the
founding of the law review itself. The law review, whatever its current
despairs, has proved a remarkable institution in the 75 years or so since
volume i, number i, of the HarvardLaw Review made its debut. The idea
of a learned journal, totally edited and in part written by students, still
amazes colleagues in other areas of the university. It has provided a splendid
method of "clinical training" for a law-school elite, and a hospitable forum
for legal scholarship. American legal education would be very different and
much the poorer without it. I belabor these familiar themes because we may
be on the brink of another breakthrough in legal scholarship via the law
review.
The rapprochement between law and social science has had a fitful and
uneven career for over half a century now. The last decade has finally seen
a shift from prospectus to concrete work, and we have harvested a small
shelf of books reflecting serious and sustained empirical inquiries into law
and its institutions. But there remain great puzzles as to how to organize
such research ventures, how to recruit personnel to them, and how to fit
them into the traditions and rhythms of more traditional legal scholarship.
A chief source of these difficulties has been the circumstance that law
schools, unlike other graduate areas at a university, do not really have cadres
of graduate students to man research. Another source, perhaps, has been the
fact that law faculty have essentially been trained in another tradition, and
are likely to find the technique, pace, and style of such research somewhat
alien. Accordingly, there are many proposals for special interdisciplinary
institutes to train law faculty, special courses in methodology to stimulate
student interest, creation of special centers at universities for interdisciplinary research, and the devising of strategies for enlivening interest in graduate study in law. But the truth remains that the contemporary momentum
for empirical inquiry in law is considerably slowed by the stubborn facts of
organization.
It is at this juncture that the law reviews may once again be coming to
the rescue of legal education. The young have the energy and the gallantry
to gamble; they are less committed to customs of scholarship; they may
well be better educated in methodology; today especially they show a deep
interest in social reality and hence an appetite for fact. In brief, there is the
possibility-which efforts like this study of the death penalty do much to
strengthen-that empirical inquiry into legal institutions will prove a
"natural" for the student editors of the law reviews and thus make possible
the new scholarship on a wide front.
But even as one writes, some sober second thoughts arise. What the lawschool world needs at this time are empirical studies of quality, of intellec-
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tual rigor comparable to that which has gone into professional law study.
The ultimate objective, it must always be remembered, is not to revolutionize law but to enrich it, to develop not a competing but a companion discipline for its study. One of the current sicknesses of the law reviews is that
so much of the work published is simply mediocre and can be justified
mainly as a writing and research exercise for the student. The law reviews,
partly because there are so very many of them, run the risk of being instances
of a vanity press. The new danger is that we will spawn via the law reviews
a mass of ill-digested, uncritical, drab empirical studies that will only confirm the skeptics. The emergence of the law review empirical student note
is another indication that what the law-school world needs today is to develop taste in empirical inquiry.
After so many generalities, let me turn briefly to the specific study. The
design and the focus of inquiry are simple and coherent. The purpose was
to study the performance of the jury in capital cases under the special California procedure in which there is a separate trial on penalty, after guilt has
been established. The universe was the cases where this procedure had been
used in the interval from 1958 to 1966, in which the same jury had decided
both guilt and penalty. Since the number of cases in the universe was relatively small and since they were confined to a single state, albeit California,
it was possible to collect all cases in the universe, and thus avoid the often
troublesome issue of sampling. As a result the study is based on some 238
cases in all in which the death penalty could have been given. In fact it was
actually selected by the jury in 1O3 of the cases. The study thus surmounts
one obvious obstacle to empirical study of the death penalty, namely, the
relative infrequency with which it is given today. In The American Jury,
for example, where Hans Zeisel and I had the advantage of a large national
sample of criminal jury trials, we nevertheless ended up with only 21 cases
in which the jury actually voted death.
The research design involved what is known as secondary analysis, that
is, the utilization of records and data which are already in existence and require only analysis. Compare again The American Jury, in which we had
to generate to a considerable degree our data by having judges tell us how
they would have decided these cases had they tried them without a jury.
The note writers, in effect, "interviewed" the files and collected information on some 178 items about each case. It is worth noting again that they
did not have to wait for capital cases to arise but could utilize past cases.
The study is built on the mass of data generated by having c78 items of
information about each of 238 cases. The question they put to their data is
a clear one: What accounts for the incidence of the death penalty, which
was given in somewhat less than half of the cases in which the jury had the
power to give it?
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The force and quality of the answer will depend on two factors: the
adequacy of their network of 178 items about the case and the competence
of their statistical analysis of the data. I have neither the time nor the competence to attempt such an assessment here, but I would nevertheless offer
two quick reactions. First, the choice of who, among those the legislature
has made eligible for death, should die must, insofar as it does not altogether
defy analysis, depend often on factors of the greatest subtlety, nuances of
personality or demeanor. These are precisely the kinds of facts that might
well escape the net of an after-the-fact questionnaire. The note writers were
admirably diligent and patient in their pursuit of data about each case, but
some of the fish must have been too small for their net.
Second, the note writers are quite dear about the essential analytic problem their data pose. It will not be enough simply to run each of the 178
factors against the penalty and see for which the incidence of the death
penalties was significantly higher. One cannot so simply approximate the
logic of the experiment when one is working retrospectively. For any given
factor it cannot be assumed that except for it the cases in which death was
or was not given were otherwise the same, so that it represents the only relevant difference between them. The problem then is to control for the interaction of other factors with the factor being tested, so as to avoid what the
statistician calls a spurious correlation.
The note tackles this problem by a statistical technique which is beyond
my competence and which gives every appearance of having been pursued
with rigor. My somewhat unhappy reactions are twofold: First, it is likely
that no legal readers of the note will be able to judge the logic of the
method; second, it places a great strain on the exposition of the study, a
strain the authors do not altogether meet. They simply cannot carry the
reader with them in the logical game of analyzing their data. The analysis
as reported becomes curiously mechanical, with the computer playing the
main role. The tables offered verge on the unreadable and uninteresting.
The possibilities of discursive analysis are thus severely curtailed, with a
consequent loss of interest. The story can have no plot, and they might just
as well have simply given us the list of 178 items and told us which ones the
computer reported were independently significant variables. The note may
thus mark a major dilemma for us all and for sociology in general. If the
statistical techniques are as powerful and economical as they appear, they
represent a gain. But the price for the new technology seems to be that
humane exposition becomes virtually impossible.
I would suggest also that the authors risk being corrupted somewhat
by their passion for turning their findings into constitutional arguments
against the death penalty. It keeps them from being speculative enough
about the mystery they are inquiring into. They never pause to reflect on
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how extraordinary must be the decision as to who among those eligible for
death is to die. They are forced by their practical concerns to emphasize
greatly the finding that the jury discriminates between white-collar and
blue-collar workers. I am not persuaded that this is an expression of simple
class bias and not a reflection of a more subtle concern with personality and
character. Moreover, this distracts them from two other points of deep interest. First is the degree to which the jury decisions as to death cannot be
explained, which I would like to think is the consequence of society asking
an unanswerable question of the jury. Second, they are underimpressed
with their extraordinary finding that race plays no role in explaining the
incidence of the death penalty. Surely there is embedded in that point a
profound secret both about the nature of race prejudice and the nature of
law.
But on balance I am delighted by the seriousness, weight, and sophistication of their effort, and I am excited by the happy prospects it stirs up
for the future.
Harry Kalven, Jr.*
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